This research investigates if the stringent 2020 and 2050 overarching CO2 mitigation objectives set out by the European Union dominate its 2010 to 2020 targets specific to the transportation arena, specifically its biofuel penetration objectives and gram CO 2 per kilometre emission caps. Using a dynamic recursive general equilibrium model, IMACLIM-R, we demonstrate that these overarching targets do not dominate the interim transportation targets when the carbon policy triggering compliance with the mitigation objectives boils down to the theoretical least-cost option of uniform carbon pricing. Ground transportation is confirmed as quite insensitive to high carbon prices, even when such prices are applied over a long term. It is tempting to conclude that pursuing the mitigatio n objectives specific to transportation will impose unnecessary costs. However, because of the second best conditions prevailing in actual economies, and of the risk of lock-in in carbon intensive trajectories, we conclude with the urgent need for some ambitious transport-specific policy design research agenda.
Introduction
The European Union developed two important and related strategies concerning transportation and sustainability in 2001. The first, the White Paper on Transport, investigated the trends in transport for the coming decade and proposed a number of policy packages (CEC, 2001a) . The second, the Sustainable Development Strategy (SDS), articulated, for the first time, an integrated EU policy on sustainability (CEC, 2001b) . Recent reviews of both documents reaffirmed and extended the commitments o f European policymakers in these areas. The White Paper on Transport was central to European policymaking in this area for the period up to 2010 and received considerable attention from policymakers and researchers alike. It has recently been replaced by a new strategy for the period up to 2020 (CEC, 2011a).
However, relatively little academic focus has centred on the potential impacts of the SDS on transportation trends in the European Union. Its overriding environmental objective is to cap the increase in global temperature rise to 2°C above pre-industrial levels by the end of this century. In order to achieve this goal, the European Union (EU) has committed itself to stringent interim targets in carbon dioxide (CO 2) emissions reductions by 2020 and 2050 respectively. The target is to reduce EU emissions by 20% compared to 1990 levels in the absence of any international agreement by 2020 and by 60 to 80% by 2050 (CEU, 2007) . This 2050 target was subsequently raised to an 80 to 95% reduction objective in lat e 2009 through a European Council stated objective within the context of a broader international agreement (DGE, 2011) . More recently, the European Commission adopted its "Energy Roadmap 2050" as a basis for developing a long-term European energy use framework that also enshrines the 80-95% target (CEC, 2011b) . It is clear that the pursuit and achievement of these long term targets will, almost by necessity, impact on future trends in European transportation.
In this paper, we investigate the impact of these overarching carbon constraints on the more focused short-term transportation objectives outlined in the SDS. To do this, we project the state and trends of European transportation up to 2050 in a business-as-usual or reference scenario, and compare it to an ambitious carbon-pricing scenario that proxies for the 2020 and 2050 emissions targets, at least at their pre-2009 levels.
1 The reference and carbon-constrained scenarios are projections of the global dynamic recursive computable general equilibrium model IMACLIM-R. The model has specifically been devel-oped by CIRED to guarantee a full consistency between macroeconomic and energy balances. Our purpose is to develop the above scenarios with the aim of exploring whether reaching both the interim 20% and the long-term 60%-80% reduction in CO2 emissions by 2020 and 2050 through standard carbon pricing necessarily 'dominates', i.e. implies compliance with, other targets specifically related to the transport sphere outlined in the SDS-and develop a better understanding as to why it does or does not.
The outline of the paper is as follows: section 1 presents some key transportation trends in the European Union as it stands, it also outlines some of the problems associated with transport, and investigates some of the key Europe-wide policy responses developed by policymakers. Section 2 briefly reviews the SDS, paying particular attention to its role in relation to transport. Section 3 presents an overview of the IMACLIM-R model and reports key assumptions and general results of the baseline and policy projections. Section 4 focuses on transport and tests the hypothesis outlined above. Finally, section 5 concludes with some policy observations.
I. Transportation trends in the European Union
The growth in demand for road transportation in Europe has been rapid in recent decades. European policymakers turned towards analyzing and mitigating the negative impacts of these trends with the publication of the first White Paper on transportation in 1992. But by 2001, the numbe r of cars in the EU had trebled over 1970 levels to almost 175 million and continued to grow by about 3 million cars a year at the turn of the century (CEC, 2001a) . In tandem with this, personal mobility on the continent doubled (CEC, 2006) and increased by another 7% in the period up to (CEC, 2011c . As a result, between 1995 and 2004 road transportation grew by 19% for passenger cars and by 35% for freight movements (measured by passenger-kilometres and tonne-kilometres respectively), continuing a long seen trend. Only with the economic crisis, beginning in 2008, did these trends slow (CEC, 2011c) . The impact on Europe's oil consumption and emissions of greenhouse gases is significant. Transport accounts for over 30% of final energy consumption in the EU. By 2006 the road transportation sector accounted for 44% of total freight transport (tonne kilometres) and almost 85% of total passenger transport (passenger kilometres) (CEC, 2006) . The White Paper Midterm Review (CEC, 2006) notes that the private car accounts for three-quarters of passenger transport while transport by bus and coach combined accounts for less than 10% (these latter modes have grown by a modest 5% over the last decade). As a result of such trends, private cars account for half of ener gy consumed by transport (EEA, 2012 The European Commission has long recognised the economic costs of excessive growth in road transport demand (cf. e.g. CEC, 1992; CEC, 1993) . It often results in congestion because of the public good nature of road space (Sterner, 2003) . But the costs of road transport are not restricted to users of the infrastructure. Indeed, the external costs of road traffic congestion, 3 were projected to more than double from 0.5% of EU gross domestic product (GDP) in 2001 by the end of the decade (CEC, 2001a).
The recently published White Paper (CEC, 2011a; CEC, 2011c) estimated that congestion costs would reach €200 billion per annum by 2050. The additional costs of road transportation also include accidents, road damage externalities and environmental costs. The latter costs consist of regional environmental effects (including barrier effects imposed by transportation infrastructure, 4 acidification and noise) and air pollution (with both local and global impacts). This point is especially relevant given the increase in transport-related greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions and previously stated broader European commitments to the Kyoto Protocol and other initiatives to reduce GHG emissi ons, exemplified by programs such as the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme. Partly as a result of increasing emissions from road transport sources (up by 30% since 1990; CEC, 2007), many countries are now struggling to meet their commitments to comply with agreed Kyoto Protocol limits.
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Consequently, the focus of European policymakers in the area of transportation has widened from a primarily economic analysis, as per the first White Paper of 1992 (CEC, 1992) , to encompass the other two spheres of sustainability, namely the environmental and social areas. This has been mirrored in the development of the 2001 White Paper (CEC, 2001a) . This strategy , covering the period up to 2010 (with an update in 2006 that extended analysis to 2020), 6 outlined a number of key objectives for transportation in Europe such as providing high levels of mobility to people and businesses while protecting passenger safety, energy security, sustainability and efficiency (CEC, 2006) .
While longer term objectives aimed at balancing these competing needs were referred to in the 2001 White Paper, specific long-term policy outcomes were beyond its scope. Accordingly, in 2008, the Commission proposed a strategy for greening transportation. The subsequent White Paper, launched in 2011 (CEC, 2011a), attempts to set out a roadmap for a single transportation area and recognises the need for analyses of longer term transportation trends and proposed goals over a time frame of 20 -40 years (CEC, 2007) . Specifically, it refers to the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 60%
by 2050 with respect to 1990 levels. Without any action, it projects that CO2 emissions will be one third higher by that time. Consequently, while the inter-relations between transport and other areas in the economic, environmental and social spheres were alluded to, it is only with the most recent white paper that they have begun to be analysed together. For a broader overview of European polic ymaker's goals in regard to longer-term climate change objectives, we can continue to look towards the SDS (CEC, 2001b) .
II. The European Union Sustainable Development Strategy
The initial move towards sustainability in policymaking was the foundation and reporting of the World
Commission on Environment and Development-the 'Brundtland Commission '-in 1987 '-in (UN, 1987 . Its definition of sustainability-development meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs-is the most frequently cited one. and a 60-80% reduction in CO2 emissions by 2020 and 2050 respectively on transport sub -targets.
III. Scenario Development
The baseline and the policy scenario that allow us to test our research hypothesis are projections of the IMACLIM-R model; both the model and the scenario assumptions are outlined below.
III.1. The IMACLIM-R Model
IMACLIM-R is a hybrid recursive general equilibrium model of the world economy divided into 12 regions and 12 sectors As a general equilibrium model, IMACLIM-R provides a consistent macroeconomic framework to assess the energy-economy relationships by means of clearing factor and goods markets. Rooted in its hybrid calibration, the modelling architecture specifically aims at an easy incorporation of technological information coming from bottom-up models and experts' judgements into the projected economic trajectories: physical variables that explicitly characterise equipment, infrastructure and technologies ( e.g. the 7 efficiency of cars, the intensity of production in transport measured in tonne -kilometres, etc.) allow rigorously modelling how final demand and technical systems are transformed by economic incentives .
The economy is thus defined both in money-metric terms and in physical quantities, with the two dimensions linked by a price vector. This dual vision is designed to guarantee a realistic technical background to the projected economy or, conversely, a realistic economic background to any projected technical system.
To fully exploit the potential of this dual representation requires abandoning the use of conventional aggregate production functions that, after Berndt and Wood (1975) and Jorgenson (1981) , were admitted to mimic the set of available aggregate production techniques and thus the technical constraints impinging on an economy. Indeed, it is arguably impossible to find mathematical functions flexible enough to encompass different scenarios of structural changes resulting from the interplay between consumption styles, technologies and localisation patterns (Hourcade, 1993) , for small as well as for large departures from the reference equilibrium. In IMACLIM-R, the absence of formal production functions is compensated for by a recursive structure that allows for a systematic exchange of information between:
 An annual static equilibrium module with Leontief production functions (fixed equipment stocks and intensities of intermediary inputs, especially labour and energy )-but flexible utilisation rates.
Solving this equilibrium at some year t provides a snapshot of the economy: information about relative prices, output levels, physical flows and profit rates for each sector and allocation of investments among sectors.
 Dynamic modules, including demography, capital dynamics and sector-specific reduced forms of technology-rich models, most of which assess the reactions of technical systems to the previous static equilibria. These reactions are then reintroduced into the static module in the form of updated input-output coefficients to calculate year t+1 equilibrium.
Between two equilibria, technical choices are fully flexible for new capital only : input-output coefficients and labour productivity indexes are modified at the margin, to account for the fixed techniques embodied in existing equipment and resulting from past technical choices. This general 'putty-clay' assumption is critical to representing the inertia in technical systems and the perverse effect of volatility in economic signals.
IMACLIM-R thus generates economic trajectories by solving successive yearly static equilibria of the economy interlinked through dynamic modules. Within the static equilibrium, in each region, the demand for each good is derived from household consumption, government consumption, investment and intermediate uses from the production sectors. Supply is derived from domestic production or imports, as all goods and services are traded on world markets. Domestic and international markets for all goods-excluding labour-are cleared by a unique set of relative prices that depend on the demand and supply behaviours of representative agents. The calculation of this equilibrium determines relative prices, wages, labour, quantities of goods and services, and value flows.
In this framework, the main exogenous drivers of economic growth are population and labour productivity dynamics. However, international trade, particularly that of energy commodities, and imperfect markets for both labour (wage curve) and capital (constrained capital flows, varying utilisati on rates of productive capacities) can significantly impact on economic growth.
In the IMACLIM-R model transportation activities are typically modelled as complex technical systems constrained by the consistent general macroeconomic framework (cf. Appendix):
 First, the transportation demand described in the static equilibrium module allows for the representation of stylised facts, such as rebound effects associated with energy efficiency improvement or the demand induction by infrastructure that impact both total mobility and the underlying modal breakdown. To that end, the mobility of households is defined as an aggregate of 4 imperfectly substitutable travelling modes (air travel, public terrestrial modes, personal cars and non -motorised modes). It is one of the elements of the utility function of the representative household of each region. In addition to their budget constraint, households are subject to a travelling -time constraint.
Last but not least, a 'travelling time efficiency' (average distance co vered in an hour of time) factor for each mode is described as an increasing function of public investment in the infrastructure dedicated to this mode. As for productive sectors, transport consumption, an intermediate input, depends on the crossing of specific input-output coefficients (reflecting each sector's transportation intensity) and the level of activity in each economic sector.
 Second, the transportation dynamic module allows for the altering of technical constraints that hinge on transportation demand formation in the static equilibrium: the module keeps track of and marginally modifies the fleet composition and energy efficiency of personal cars, the transport intensity of economic activity and, last but not least, the particulars of infrastructu re policies.
The total time dedicated by households to mobility evolves in tandem with total population. The motorisation rate is a function of per capita disposable income, according to an income-elasticity that quadratically declines as it increases, up to a 700 vehicles per 1000 inhabitants asymptote meant to translate a saturation effect.
On the technology side, 10 evolution of the mean energy intensity of the automobile fleet is related to final energy prices through a representation of households' equ ipment choices among 5 representative car technologies: standard and efficient conventional cars, standard and efficient hybrid cars and electric cars. Each technology is characterised by a capital cost and an energy efficiency expressed in litres of gasoline equivalent (lge) per 100 kilometres. Various investment policies can be tested for their impact on average modal speeds. Throughout this paper and due to brevity concerns, however, we stick to the conservative assumption that the building of transportation infrastructure follows the evolution of modal mobility.
Road and rail freight and public passenger transportation are aggregated in one productive s ector. The evolution of this sector's energy input coefficients therefore accounts for both energy efficiency gains and shifts between road and rail modes. This evolution is triggered by final energy price variations, based on a compact reaction function calibrated on bottom-up information from the POLES energy sector model (Criqui, 2001) . The evolution of the freight content of economic growth, which is represented by the transportation input-output coefficients of all the productive sectors in the economy , is an exogenous scenario variable in this paper. However, we note that it is indeed debatable how energy prices affect a firm's choice of localisation and production management and these parameters are likely to play a central role in cost-effective mitigation policies (Crassous et al., 2006) .
Finally, fuels are produced by a petroleum products sector, undifferentiated between gasoline and diesel. Biofuels and coal-to-liquid (CTL) fuels progressively enter the fuel mix. Biofuel penetration follows a set of worldwide supply curves provided by the IEA (IEA, 2006, pp. 283 and 288) for bio -ethanol and bio-diesel production, that are transposed as functions of the production price of conventional fuels augmented by the carbon tax differential (the difference between the carbon tax levied on conventional fuels and that levied on each biofuel). 14 CTL penetration is based on a microeconomic representation of investment behaviour, taking into account the dynamics of oil prices and some constraint on growth also derived from IEA analysis (IEA, 2008) .
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III.2. The baseline or 'reference' (REF) scenario
The baseline or 'reference' (REF) scenario depicts business-as-usual economic growth in the absence of any carbon constraint (Table 2) . At the world level, it envisages a doubling of real per capita income between 2001 and 2050, and thus corresponds to the lower range of the SRES scenarios (Nakicenovic et al., 2000) , between the A2 and the B2 markers (which multiply per capita income by 1.8 and 2.5 respectively). Behind this aggregate picture, regional dynamics differ substantially as they are characterised by a partial catch up between industrialised and developing countries ( cf. e.g. Sala-i-Martin, 1991, 1992; Quah, 1996) :
16  Europe and the other industrialised countries (OIC) suffer from a demographic slowdown that is unequally compensated by sustained gains of labour productivity. Compared to OIC, Europe is assumed to benefit from higher labour productivity improvements over the first three deca des (the catch-up hypothesis), which results into higher growth.
 China and India have their extremely high current growth rates reduced, as ( i) their labour productivity improvements increase to a peak, (ii) their demography stabilises, and (iii) rapidly increasing energy prices hamper their relatively energy-intensive economic activity.
 Fossil fuels exporters (FFE) suffer from both stabilising demographics and a relatively low gain in labour productivity, that are imperfectly compensated by the rents they extract from increasingly tense energy markets.
 In the rest of the world (ROW), increases in labour productivity slowly take over the sheer impact of demographics as the latter effect slows down. Table 3 . Average annual growth of CO2 emissions, REF scenario
Turning to environmental performance, the comparison of Table 2 and Table 3 reveals a significant decoupling of growth and CO2 emissions. In the absence of carbon constraint this is mainly due to two major determinants:
 First, the physical constraints that limit the evolution of fossil fuel supply lead to a general increase of fossil energy prices along the projection. The price of coal on international markets experiences a 73% increase between 2001 and 2050, and the price of natural gas increases by almost 160% over the same period. The price of oil displays the most dramatic increase (cf. nologies enter the markets and alternative liquid fuel production (mainly second generation biofuels and synthetic fuels from coal-to-liquid production) develops. This general increase in fossil fuel prices fosters both the penetration of carbon-free energy sources (renewable and nuclear) into the primary energy mix, and the diffusion of energy-efficient equipment, which reduce the energy intensity of economic growth. Higher energy prices also induce structural changes in the econo mies in favour of the less energy-intensive activities.
 Second, the general increase in wealth is endogenously associated with a dematerialisation of growth: as per capita income increases, economies move from a base of (energy-intensive) heavy industries to one in which services dominate. Dematerialisation is projected for the industrialised world, to a lesser extent for China and India, and in a subtly different way for fossil fuels exporters as well (a significant part of their dematerialisation occurs t hrough the increasing rents they draw from energy markets). It is much weaker for the rest of the world due to the 'mimetic development' With our focus on Europe and its transportation activities, the latter set of assumptions i s not essential to our demonstration. It is only proposed as a more plausible option than unilateral action by Europe, which would cause strong distortions on international markets given the levels of carbon prices implied by the constraints. 1.6% (-0.0) Other industrialised countries 2.1% (-0.2) 1.5% (-0.0) 1.6% (+0.1)
1.7% (-0.0) China and India 9.1% (-0.4) 3.3% (-0.1) 2.3% (+0.1)
4.4% (-0.1) Fossil fuels exporters 4.8% (-1.0) 2.6% (-0.1)
1.7% (+0.4)
2.8% (-0.1) Rest of the world 4.9% (-0.1) 3.3% (-0.0) 2.6% (-0.0) 3.4% (-0.1) The general macroeconomic consequences of such major mutations of the energy systems are not as dramatic as one might expect-although it must be kept in mind that a GDP growing 1.7% a year will be 5% above one growing 1.6% a year after 50 years. They depend to some extent on the characteristics of each region, but, generally speaking, economies bear the brunt of the constraint in the shorter run ( (that are not very reactive to carbon prices) in a consistent way with the climate objective. The cost of stabilisation would probably be reduced with such a policy package (cf. e.g. Gusdorf et al., 2008) .
IV. European road transportation: from current trends to a carbon constrained European Union
Let us now turn to the analysis of how the 2020 and 2050 OCCs impact the CO 2 emissions from ground transportation in Europe. To systematise this analysis we will successively report mobility, energy consumption (backed by an analysis of the private car fleet), and CO 2 emissions for motorised ground transport.
Aggregate motorised ground passenger mobility (i.e. the sum of private car, bus and rail passenger mobility), measured in passenger-kilometres (pkm), appears quite resistant to the high carbon prices pre- 
Figure 5. European motorised ground mobility
The evolution of freight tonnes-kilometres (tkm) follows a pattern similar to that of GDP, as freight transport highly depends on the overall level of activity. However, the impact of OCC on freight activity Still, ground motorised mobility appears to be relatively insensitive to high carbon prices in both its passenger and freight dimensions. This result is echoed to some extent in the related energy consumption. Measured in million tonnes of oil equivalent (MTOE), consumpt ion declines in the OCC scenario compared with their REF values (Figure 6 ), but the high carbon prices required by the OCC fail to curb down total energy consumption in absolute terms, and barely achieve its stabilisation. The split between fuels is also only marginally impacted; conventional fuels retain their two -third share of total energy: high carbon prices have the counter-intuitive effect of relaxing the tensions on international oil market, thus moderating the ultimate relative impact of OCC on gaso line prices. In the remaining third, however, the massive development of coal-to-liquid technologies projected in REF is blocked by high carbon prices, in the favour of biofuels, whose 2050 production is 120% higher than in the REF scenario.
Although hybrid and electric cars begin to weigh in the total fleet at the end of the projected period 
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Generally speaking, we find that all the outlined targets are missed in OCC as in REF, and missed by considerable distances (Table 5) . On biofuel penetration, in 2010 biofuel development spectacularly fails to meet its target, irrespective of the OCC, for the simple reason that the policy scenario does not diverge from the REF trajectory before 2011. in 2020 the OCC scenario starts to make a visible difference, as both the price incentive has developed, and time has elapsed allowing the development of production capacities. Still, the target is far from being reached: biofuels development still only makes up 40% of the target.
The results on the average CO2 efficiency of new cars are more sensitive to the OCC scenario in the short term: as early as 2012 imposing the OCC cuts the 14 g/km compliance gap of REF in half. This higher responsiveness of fuel efficiency to pricing strategies is in part explained by the lesser inertia of mere market share shifts for already existing technologies (more efficient conventional vehicles and hybrid vehicles), compared to the development of industrial biofuel capacities. Still, by 2020 the 37 g/km excess is only cut down to 25 g/km, and the 95 g/km is miss ed by 26%.
These findings point once again at the low reactivity of the transportation sector to carbon policies that are exclusively price-based. Even in an ambitious climate scenario, in which policymakers resort to a stringent pricing of carbon with the aim of fulfilling an overarching reduction objective, there is no guarantee that interim or long term policy targets will be attained for the transportation sector. The biofuel and energy efficiency policy objectives are goals in themselves, which appear to require addi-22 tional policy initiatives to be achieved. As a result, based on this evidence, we reject the hypothesis that the presence of such a long-range target will 'dominate' specific sectoral objectives.
Conclusion
Our research rejects the hypothesis that even stringent short-and long-term overarching CO2 mitigation targets dominate (i.e. necessary imply compliance with) short-run objectives in the transportation arena. More specifically, our simulations demonstrate that hitting mitigation targets in the lower range of outlined overarching European objectives, i.e. constraining CO2 emissions 22% and 65% below their 1990 level in 2020 and 2050 respectively, through the implementation of uniform economy -wide carbon prices, does not succeed in triggering significant changes in the transportation sector compatible with outlined 2010 to 2020 biofuels penetration and CO 2 intensity targets. Even in the longer term, carbon prices close to an impressive $500/tCO2 do not succeed in curbing CO2 emissions from ground transportation by more than a modest 25% decrease from their baseline trend . This is a significant step away from the 60% below 1990 levels objective of the 2011 White Paper on Transport.
In policymaking terms it is tempting to jump to the conclusio n that specific targets on transportation activities are superfluous, if anything unduly costly, as they suppose marginal prices higher than those triggering compliance to the overarching objectives. This would indeed echo the theoretical recommendation that an overarching constraint as carbon mitigation should not be fragmented in sectoral targets or technology choices (biofuels) following some unavoidably flawed political process, but should rather be enforced by adjusting a uniform price signal that would 'naturally' select the cheaper abatement opportunities, free of preconceptions.
For at least two reasons this recommendation can be questioned in the case of carbon mitigation. First, it only prevails in first best economic conditions (perfect markets, perfect information, perfect anticipations), whereas addressing the market failures and imperfections of real economies may require extended policy packages. Guivarch and Hallegatte (2011) thus demonstrate that complementing uniform carbon pricing with policies targeting the development of infrastructures, which is otherwise barred by imperfect foresight and split incentives, significantly cuts down the costs of the more ambitious mitigation objectives. Similarly, the carbon-efficiency mandates questioned in our research might be a relevant policy option to circumvent the 'split incentive' issues surrounding company cars . They could also be warranted to bridge the gap between the higher private discount rate governing car technology choices (13% in our modelling exercise) and the lower 3% to 5% discount rate commonly thought to apply to an aggregate 'social welfare' perspective. Second, even if it were possible to prove that it is economically inefficient to pursue specific transportation objectives up to 205 0, it would not mean that there is no ground to do so for objectives beyond the OCC, both more stringent and more distant in 
Passenger mobility demand
At each simulation year and in each of the 12 regions modelled (for convenience we drop time and region subscripts in the following equations), households derive utility as a Stone-Geary function of consumption Ci of n goods above basic-need levels i C , and a mobility service Sm:
The elasticities of utility to the consumptions and mobility service, i and m, are calibrated on 2001 household budget data (m = 0.129). Sm is a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) composite of the pkm travelled in the 4 represented modal aggregates, air transport, private car, public transport (except air) and non-motorised modes, above basic needs :
, the elasticity of substitution between the pkm in the different modes beyond their basic needs, is set at 3.33 ( = 0.7) for all periods and regions. The bi parameters are equal to 4 for all periods and regions-this assumption amounts to fixing a unit of measurement to Sm and does not impact on modelling results. For lack of better hypotheses, in the REF and OCC runs reported in this paper the basic needs are nil for all modes except the private car, for which they are set at 70% of the observed 2001 pkm, then progress each year at a rate 30% that of the pkm progression.
Households maximise utility under 2 constraints. They are subject to the standard budget constraint:
with R the consumption budget; pi the consumer price of good i; pair and ppublic the consumer prices of one pkm of those modes (reflecting the cost structure of their productions); pfuel and pelec the consumer prices of one ton-of-oil equivalent (TOE) of liquid fuels or electricity; and the average TOE Simultaneously, households face a time-budget constraint, which acknowledges the stability of aggregate (average) travel-time budget Tm across time and space, at 1.1 hours per person per day. This assumption is supported by numerous studies with fairly close outcomes ranging from 50 minutes to 1.3 hours per day (Zahavi and Talvitie, 1980; Bieber et al., 1994; Schaefer and Victor, 2000; Vilhelmson, 1999) . The pkm travelled with each mode add up to Tm following:
with vi the marginal speed of mode i (the speed of one additional pkm), which depends on the utilisation rate of Qi, an index of the pkm capacity of mode i, following:
The maximum speeds vi0 of the air, private car, public and soft modes are respectively set at 700, 80, 50 and 5 km/h. The ai and i parameters are calibrated on the mobility and budget share data of 2001, and on the supplementary assumption that saturation (Di = Qi) drives the speed vi down to 5 km/h (for all i vi(1) = 5). However, in both our REF and OCC scenarios and for any mode i, Qi is assumed to evolve as Di, which amounts to considering constant speed for all mo des.
Freight mobility demand
At each simulation year the (short run) cost structure of all productions is assumed to be fixed, following a Leontief production function. In particular, the intensity of all productions in each of three aggregate freight transportation modes (air, water and terrestrial transport , which includes both road and rail modes because of data limitations) is measured by input-output coefficients, which define a linear dependence of current freight mobility to all current production volumes. The input-output coefficients implicitly capture the spatial organisation of the production processes and the constraints imposed on distribution by the distances to markets and the prevalence of just -in-time processes. In both the REF and OCC runs they are exogenously decreased over time (-0.55% a year up to 2040, linearly reduced to -0.35% in 2050) to capture logistic improvements of the production and distribution processes. Following Dargay et al. (2007) with LCCi the life-cycle cost of technology i computed for the current regional mileage and fuel/electricity prices over a 15-year horizon considering a 13% discount rate (discussed in Vogt -Schilb The energy efficiency of modes other than the private car is not represented through explicit vehicle technologies. It is rather implicitly captured through the evolution of the input -output coefficients measuring the intensity of each mode (water, air and terrestrial transport) in automotive fuels and electricity (where applicable):
Transportation technologies and energy efficiency
 The fuel intensity of terrestrial transport is elastic to fuel prices according to a -0.35 elasticity (constant across regions and times).
 The fuel intensity of air transportation benefits from exogenous energy efficiency improvements of 0.7% a year.
 The fuel intensity of water transportation remains constant at its 2001 calibration level.
 The electricity intensity of terrestrial transport remains constant at its 2001 calibration level (the electricity intensities of the 2 other modes are nil and remain so) . Figure A1, Figure A2 ). The potential MTOE contribution of biofuels to global fuel demand is determined by comparing the USD per lge production costs in ordinate of each curves with the international producer cost of conventional fuel production ; in case carbon pricing is in force this cost is adjusted to account for the carbon emission differential of the fuels -bio-ethanol and bio-diesel are assumed carbon contents 20% and 10% below that of the conventional gasolineequivalent. Each macro region is then assumed to consume the produced biofuels prorata its current conventional consumption. 
Coal-to-liquid substitute
Beyond the exogenous threshold of 100 year-2001 dollars per barrel of oil, a coal-to-liquid (CTL) substitute to automotive fuels is produced each year based on an imperfect anticipation of the gap between the supply and demand of conventional fuels, on a regional basis. On the supply side, CTL producers perfectly anticipate the increase of the regional conventional refining capacities, and have full information on the global supply curves of biofuel production; however, they wrongly assume maintained utilisation rates of the refining capacities, together with unchanged international average production prices of the conventional fuels and a stable distribution among regions of biofuel production (to anticipate regional biofuel supply). On the demand side, they project aggregate regional demand according to its observed one-year trend. If a shortage of supply results from the crossing of these anticipations, a matching CTL volume is produced.
This volume is sold at a price that is not modelled as such: CTL fuels are not stand-alone goods but are part of the gasoline-equivalent good produced by the refined petroleum products sector. Based on a central 0.7 efficiency assumption (one MTOE of coal is necessary to produce 0.7 MTOE of coal-to-liquid fuel; this efficiency is quite higher than the 0.33 efficiency that can be inferred from current AIE energy balances, but it applies to later years of the projection period) , the volume of CTL production impacts on the cost structure of the refining sector through its direct coal costs, and through the higher other primary and secondary factor consumptions induced by the increase of the total gasoline -equivalent output of the sector, considering the prevailing factor intensities. In other words, CTL production is assumed the same cost structure as conventional fuel production, except that coal is substituted to oil as a primary input (on the basis of 1/0.7 = 1.43 MTOE per MTOE of output).
Endnotes
1 We restricted our analysis to the less extreme pre-2009 levels for the simple reason that the -80% threshold is barred by some of the technical asymptotes built in the current version of IMACLIM -Rwhich are meant to reflect the current state-of-the-art of bottom-up expertise on both intermediate and final energy consumptions. Clarke et al. (2009) provide a discussion of the reasons why extreme abatement targets cannot be achieved by models similar to IMACLIM -R (as the SGM model, which takes part to the study they report on).
